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BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS IN BANKRUPTCY: 
DISCHARGE BY CERTIFICATE OF THE OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE 
IN SINGAPORE 
After more than a hundred years, Singapore made major 
reforms to its bankruptcy laws in 1995. These changes 
attracted considerable public interest, with the Government 
taking pains to emphasise that the new law was designed to 
“strike a balance between the interest of the debtor, the 
creditor and society”. The greatest scrutiny of the provisions, 
to determine whether in law and in practice the competing 
interests of debtors and creditors could effectively be 
balanced, was in respect of the discharge provisions. In this 
article, the writer, who was then the Official Assignee, 
discusses how the novel remedy of discharge by certificate of 
the Official Assignee was conceived, drafted and successfully 
implemented. 
S Chandra MOHAN 
LLB (Hons), LLM (University of Singapore), PhD (London); 
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); 
Practice Associate Professor of Law, Singapore Management University. 
I. Introduction 
1 Bankruptcy or personal insolvency results from a debtor’s 
inability or refusal to settle his debts. It is, therefore, nothing more than 
a private dispute between a debtor and his creditors. Yet, it has never 
been treated in Singapore, as in England, “as an exclusively private 
matter”.1 It is surprising, for instance, that there has been no objection to 
the need for special bankruptcy rules and regulations beyond existing 
laws and procedures governing civil disputes. Nor have serious 
questions been raised on the propriety of state intervention, at public 
expense, in such private disputes which involve possible conflicts of 
interest between debtors, creditors and the public. 
2 In recent years, the most important insolvency issue that has 
engaged public attention is the manner in which bankrupts are 
discharged from bankruptcy.2 There are various reasons for this. The 
                                                                       
1 Insolvency Law Review Committee (UK) (“The Cork Committee”), Insolvency Law 
and Practice (1982) (Cmnd 8558) at para 390. 
2 Bankruptcy has been the subject of many media reports, letters to the press and 
parliamentary questions. The Select Committee inquiring into the Bankruptcy Bill 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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growing population of undischarged bankrupts has raised concerns in a 
country which uses public funds for bankruptcy administration. The 
provision of an orderly process for dealing with the financial affairs of 
insolvent persons is important for Singapore, an international financial 
centre and trading hub, which encourages investors and entrepreneurs. 
Unlike corporations under liquidation which can finally be put to rest, 
bankruptcies involve people who need a fresh start in life. This is 
especially so if their insolvency is the result of misfortune rather than 
malpractice. Finally, there is the realisation in all quarters that 
proceedings in bankruptcy cannot always be terminated solely by the 
private efforts of combatants with conflicting interests. 
II. The move towards bankruptcy reforms 
A. The archaic Bankruptcy Act 
3 Until 1995, Singapore’s bankruptcy laws were based on the 
archaic, excessively pro-creditor, Bankruptcy Ordinance of 1888.3 This 
was modelled by the British colonial government on the English 
Bankruptcy Act of 1883, “developed during the period of the Industrial 
Revolution against a backdrop of Victorian values”.4 Other than for 
minor amendments, the 1883 Ordinance remained unchanged for more 
than a hundred years. It is indeed astonishing that Singapore, a 
developing country and reputable financial centre, was functioning with 
archaic bankruptcy laws for more than a hundred years. 
4 Since 1987 there were renewed calls in Parliament to the 
Minister of Law for the review of the bankruptcy laws. These came more 
frequently after the enactment of the UK Insolvency Act of 19865 which 
had made substantial amendments to the insolvency laws in the UK. 
5 The quick fix that was first proposed in 1990 was to import into 
Singapore the whole of the UK Insolvency Act of 1986 “lock, stock and 
barrel” and the massive 600-odd subsidiary rules needed to support the 
UK Act.6 Fortunately, the introduction of this massive Bill was delayed 
because of disagreements over the qualifying period for the proposed 
automatic discharges when the Bill was circulated amongst various 
                                                                                                                               
in 1994 received 35 representations on this subject. See the Report of the Select 
Committee on the Bankruptcy Bill (Bill No 16/94), Eighth Parliament of Singapore.  
3 Cap 20, 1985 Rev Ed. 
4 Roslinda Baba, “Bankruptcy Act 1995: Protecting Creditors Without Stifling 
Entrepreneurship” (1995) 9 Asia Business Law Review 63. 
5 See infra n 33. 
6 See Anna Teo, “Singapore revives plan to change law on discharge of bankrupts” 
Business Times (1 March 1993).  
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professional bodies. It was subsequently abandoned on the advice of 
new office-holders in the offices of the Attorney-General7 and the 
Official Assignee in 1991. With that began the daunting task of drafting 
a new Bankruptcy law. 
B. Problems under the old legislation 
(1) Cumbersome procedures 
6 It had been apparent for sometime that the existing Bankruptcy 
Act had a number of weaknesses8 which contributed to costs and 
substantial delays in bankruptcy administration. The law facilitated 
bankruptcies as the minimum debt level for a bankruptcy petition was a 
paltry $500 that had been set in 1955. It contained cumbersome and 
archaic procedures long abandoned in many Commonwealth countries. 
To begin with, petitioning creditors had to establish one of ten acts of 
bankruptcy and issue a bankruptcy notice, before filing a bankruptcy 
petition. Non-compliance with rules of procedure was a serious breach 
resulting often in the dismissal of the petition.9 If successful, the 
petitioning creditor would obtain two orders of court – a receiving 
order and an adjudicating order. The limited powers of the Official 
Assignee caused difficulties in his adequately supervising the affairs of a 
bankrupt. 
(2) Weaknesses in the discharge mechanisms 
7 The most significant problem, however, was the one most 
relevant to this discussion. Due to weaknesses in the discharge 
mechanisms, undischarged bankrupts remained within the bankruptcy 
regime almost indefinitely. 
8 It was not possible for a bankrupt to be discharged without a 
court order. Such an order could only be obtained if a bankrupt had 
                                                                       
7 Then Attorney-General Chan Sek Keong took a personal interest in the new Bill 
and met officers of the Official Assignee’s office at a number of meetings to discuss 
the provisions of the existing Bankruptcy Act and to discuss how these could be 
improved in a new Bill. 
8 These are well documented in the Official Assignee’s Guide to the Bankruptcy Act 
(Insolvency and Public Trustee’s Office, 2nd Ed, 1999) at [4]. See also the 
Minister’s speech at the second reading of the 1994 Bankruptcy Bill: Singapore 
Parliamentary Debates (1994) vol 63 at cols 400–401; Kala Anandarajah, et al, Law 
and Practice of Bankruptcy in Singapore and Malaysia (Butterworths Asia, 1999) 
ch 1. 
9 For a fuller discussion, see Kala Anandarajah, id, at [68–71]. In a decision after the 
1995 Act in The Straits Times Press (1975) Ltd v Wong Chee Kok [1998] SGHC 77, 
Chan Seng Onn JC held that “mere technicalities which existed previously for 
setting aside a bankruptcy notice should not be imputed into the new bankruptcy 
regime … Due regard must be had to the objects of the new Bankruptcy Act”. 
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paid his debts in full or had proposed a scheme of arrangement or 
composition which was acceptable to his creditors. For “special reasons” 
and usually where at least 50%10 of the debts had been paid, a bankrupt 
could obtain a court order for a discharge. Court applications for a 
discharge, therefore, were hardly made especially as the application had 
to be made by the bankrupt himself. 
9 With poor prospects of securing a discharge from bankruptcy, 
there was very little incentive for a bankrupt to seek a discharge by 
contributing to his bankruptcy estate for the benefit of his creditors or 
to obtain the help of his friends and relatives to do so. Consequently, the 
number of undischarged bankrupts grew exponentially over the years.11 
10 From 1984 to 1994, when new legislation was proposed, their 
numbers increased from 4,297 to 14,495, a phenomenal 337% increase.12 
In view of the high volume of undischarged bankrupts, the bankruptcy 
clearance rate, or the number of cases discharged compared to the 
number of new cases, was well below 40% until 1994.13 Consequently, 
staff morale remained low due to high volume of work. There was also a 
substantial increase in the costs of bankruptcy administration over the 
years. 
11 The constant growth in the already large number of bankrupts 
caused considerable difficulties to the Official Assignee in investigating 
into and realising the assets of bankrupts and in generally administering 
the affairs of the bankrupts. As a result, the vast majority of creditors 
received little or no dividend payments for years and were disillusioned 
with the insolvency administration in the country. In view of the poor 
conduct of bankrupts in regularly contributing to their bankruptcy 
estate, creditors were largely unwilling to even consider realistic 
proposals for settlement of debts. 
                                                                       
10 This was reduced to 20% under s 124 (j) of the 1995 Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20, 
2000 Rev Ed). 
11 See the Official Assignee &Public Trustee’s Report 1993, at [41], Fig. BK-2; 
Insolvency and Public Trustee’s Office, The Millennium Report 2000, at [22]. I am 
grateful to Official Assignee See Kee Oon and to Kala Rengasamy, Manager, 
Individual Insolvency Division (“IPTO”) for their assistance in providing statistics 
that are used in this article. 
12 See infra n 13. 
13 According to official statistics maintained by the Insolvency and Public Trustee’s 
Office, the bankruptcy clearance rate in 1994 was only 38.6%. It rose to 151% in 
1995 (when the new Act came into force), to 121% in 1996 and to a record 162% 
in 1997. 
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III. Drafting new bankruptcy legislation 
A. The challenge to the Official Assignee 
12 The Official Assignee’s task was then to put together a new 
Bankruptcy Act that would draw from the best of the existing 
legislation14and from the insolvency provisions in other jurisdictions15 
and yet address the current problems. As Singapore is an international 
financial centre and a trading hub which encourages both investments 
and entrepreneurship, the need to have a bankruptcy regime which 
balanced both the interests of creditors and debtors was considered 
critical. 
13 In proposing new bankruptcy provisions we had the benefit of 
examining two law commission reports on insolvency reform which 
have been described as representing “the freshest and most inclusive 
approach to insolvency”.16 These were the 1982 report of the UK 
Insolvency Law Review Committee under Sir Robert Cork (commonly 
referred to as the “Cork Report”)17 and the 1988 report of the Australian 
Law Reform Commission under Ron Harmer (the “Harmer Report”).18 
There were consultations with international insolvency administrators 
and visits to the UK, Australia and Germany. It was thought that an 
examination of the insolvency regime of a non-commonwealth country 
like Germany, with its stringent approach towards consumer 
bankruptcies, might prove useful, especially with the recent unification 
of East and West Germany. 
                                                                       
14 Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20, 1985 Rev Ed): eg, s 38 (disabilities of a bankrupt), s 40 
(debts provable), s 62 (powers of the Official Assignee), ss 88–92 (jurisdiction of 
the High Court, powers of the bankruptcy court, appeals in bankruptcy) were 
retained in the new Act. 
15 For example, some of the provisions adopted from the UK Insolvency Act 1986 
were s 48(1) (conditions for making an interim order), s 49(1) (nominee’s report 
on debt proposal), s 59 (bankruptcy order), s 62 (presumption of inability to pay 
debts), s 127 (effect of discharge), s 133 (defence of innocent intention). 
Sections 57 and 58 (persons who may present creditor’s and debtor’s petition), s 90 
(priority of debts), s 91 (payment of partnership debts) and s 129 (duties of a 
bankrupt) were modelled on similar provisions in the Canadian Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Act 1993 and s 116(1)–(2) (power to impound passport, etc of 
bankrupt) were taken from the Malaysian Bankruptcy Act (A360). 
16 Jukka Kilpi, The Ethics of Bankruptcy (Routledge, London, 1998) at para 129. 
17 Cmnd 8558. 
18 The Law Reform Commission Report No 45, General Insolvency Inquiry 
(Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1988). 
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B. Key reforms under the new 1995 Bankruptcy Act19 
14 It was finally decided that the main aims of the new Bankruptcy 
Act (the “Act”) ought to be to: 
(a) Reduce instances where parties resort to bankruptcy 
proceedings and to encourage the settlement of debts. The 
minimum debt for petitioning for bankruptcy was raised from 
$500 to $2,00020 and a voluntary arrangement system prior to 
bankruptcy was introduced.21 
(b) Simplify cumbersome and archaic bankruptcy 
procedures. Outdated acts of bankruptcy and bankruptcy 
notices were replaced by a statutory demand and the ground of 
the inability to pay debts as the basis for commencing 
bankruptcy proceedings.22 There was to be a single bankruptcy 
order to replace the adjudication and receiving orders.23 
(c) Enhance the Official Assignee’s powers to enforce the 
bankrupt’s legal obligations. The Official Assignee was 
empowered to detain travel documents, to enter premises and 
take inventory and seize assets.24 More importantly, bankrupts 
could be prosecuted for breaches of their legal obligations 
instead of being hauled into court for contempt of court which 
previously proved costly and rather circuitous.25 
(d) Encourage unsecured creditors to assume a more active 
role in bankruptcy proceedings by appointing private trustees 
and a creditors’ committee to advise on the administration of 
the bankruptcy estate.26 An Insolvency Assistance Fund was 
created from unclaimed monies to finance proceedings to 
recover assets on behalf of the bankruptcy estate.27 
                                                                       
19 Cap 20, 2000 Rev Ed. For a Ministerial statement of the key reforms of the Act, see 
Singapore Parliamentary Debates (1994) vol 63 at cols 399–405. 
20 See s 61(1)(a) of the 1995 Bankruptcy Act Cap 20, 2000 Rev Ed. This amount was 
further raised to $10,000 on 3 July 1999 by the Bankruptcy (Variation of Minimum 
Amount of Debt for Petition for Bankruptcy Order 1999 (GN No S 301/1999). 
21 Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20, 2000 Rev Ed) Pt V. 
22 Section 61(c) read with s 62. 
23 Section 59. 
24 Sections 116, 108. 
25 For the newly created bankruptcy offences, see Pt X (Bankruptcy Offences) of the 
Bankruptcy Act. 
26 Under Pt IV and s 80 of the Act 
27 Section 165 of the Act. The fund may be applied, for example, for the 
remuneration of special managers, payment of all costs and fees to solicitors 
appointed to commence proceedings to recover assets of the bankrupt’s estate. For 
further details, see the Official Assignee’s Guide to the Bankruptcy Act (Insolvency 
and Public Trustee’s Office, 2nd Ed, 1999) at para 4. 
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(e) Introduce a regime for easier discharges of bankruptcy. 
Described by the Minister of law in Parliament as a “major 
innovation”, its objective was stated as “to encourage 
entrepreneurship where bankrupts who have become so 
through misfortune rather than malpractice will be subjected to 
a more practical and pragmatic regime of bankruptcy”.28 
15 When the Bill was read a third time in Parliament and passed, it 
was described as a “major step in the process of updating and reforming 
our laws”.29 As the authors of one of the leading local texts on 
bankruptcy observe:30 
The focus of the Bankruptcy Bill was to find a happy balance between 
the interest of creditors, who wanted to be paid, and the interest of 
bankrupts, who wanted to be able to start afresh. It was essentially a 
tussle between maintaining commercial morality and confidence on 
the one hand and encouraging financial rehabilitation and 
entrepreneurship on the other. 
16 That the new Act and the discharge provisions, in particular, 
seek to balance the interests of both creditors and bankrupts have been 
repeatedly emphasised in Parliament by the Minister for Law.31 
IV. A regime for easier discharges from bankruptcy 
17 One of the key reforms proved the most difficult to 
conceptualise: discharge from bankruptcy. For the reasons indicated 
earlier in this paper, there was an obvious need for a major change in 
our discharge provisions if any real reform was to take effect. It had to 
somehow cater for two disgruntled groups whose interests were 
inherently incompatible: debtors and creditors. As Jukka Kilpi observes, 
in his fascinating account of “The Ethics of Bankruptcy”, bankruptcy 
discharge “poses the biggest ethical challenge and has caused the most 
controversies in public debate over bankruptcy legislation”.32 
                                                                       
28 Singapore Parliamentary Debates (1994) vol 63 at col 401. 
29 Singapore Parliamentary Debates (1995) vol 64 at col 1084. The Bankruptcy Bill was 
introduced in Parliament on 25 July 1994 and read for the second time on 
25 August 1994. It was then referred to a Select Committee which presented its 
report to Parliament on 7 March 1995. The Bill was passed on 23 March 1995 and 
was brought into force on 15 July 1995. 
30 Kala Anandarajah, Law and Practice of Bankruptcy in Singapore and Malaysia 
(Butterworths Asia, 1999) at [409]. 
31 See, eg, the Singapore Parliamentary Debates (1994) vol 63 at col 399; (1995) vol 64 
at col 399; (1998) vol 67 at col 1521; (1998) vol 68 at cols 946–947; (1999) vol 70 at 
col 2187. 
32 Jukka Kilpi, The Ethics of Bankruptcy (Routledge, London, 1998) at para 12. Kilpi 
explores ethical concerns raised by duty-based principles and other ethical theories 
as well as the moral aspects of a bankrupt’s contractual and fiduciary duties. 
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A. The rejection of automatic discharges 
18 The obvious and the easiest choice for bankruptcy discharges in 
the circumstances prevailing in 1994 was automatic discharges. There 
were advantages in such a remedy which is used in a number of 
countries including the UK, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand. It 
would help to periodically clear a large number of bankrupts from the 
system and, hence, help contain costs of bankruptcy administration. 
However, the rather tempting remedy for bankruptcy administrators 
raised some difficult questions. Would automatic discharges satisfy the 
public interest? And would this balance the interests of both bankrupts 
and creditors, a desired objective of our bankruptcy regime? When the 
Bill was tabled in Parliament in 1994, only one of the three Members of 
Parliament who spoke on the Bill was in favour of introducing 
automatic discharges.33 
(1) Disadvantages of automatic discharges 
19 The principal aim of automatic discharges is the termination of 
bankruptcy administration, not its satisfactory completion. And once 
begun, there is likely to be constant pressure to reduce the period of 
bankruptcy for such discharges. For example, the UK 1976 Insolvency 
Act introduced automatic discharges after a period of five years. This 
was reduced to three years in 1986. Similarly, in Australia, the three-year 
period of automatic discharges was reduced to six months under the 
1966 Bankruptcy Act. In both jurisdictions, consumer bankruptcies have 
soared 34 as a result, for the system plainly encourages bankruptcy filings 
to obtain a quick discharge of debts with little or no payment at all. 
Liberal discharge provisions in the US responsible for a bankruptcy 
crisis of epidemic proportions have finally resulted in the enactment in 
2005 of legislation appropriately entitled “The Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act”.35 
20 If, as the Cork Committee noted, the basic principle that should 
guide the development of a modern insolvency law is the provision of a 
“fair and orderly process for dealing with the financial affairs of 
                                                                       
33 Lawyer and MP Davinder Singh. Addressing Parliament during the Second 
Reading of the Bill on 25 August 1994, he expressed the view that, as in England, 
“there ought to be a simpler procedure where everyone is discharged after a fixed 
number of years”. See Singapore Parliamentary Debates (1994) vol 63 at col 408. 
34 See Jacob S Ziegel, Comparative Consumer Insolvency regimes – A Canadian 
Perspective (Hart Publishing, 2003). 
35 Susan Jensen, “A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005” (2005) The American Bankruptcy Law Journal, 
vol 79 [485]. 
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insolvent individuals”,36 then the extent to which the law effectively 
regulates the competing interests of creditors and debtors must be 
considered. Creditors’ interests would not be sufficiently protected 
under an automatic discharge regime. Consequently, this would affect 
the cost of credit. The more readily available the benefit of discharge, the 
higher the cost of credit.37 
(2) The views of the Select Committee 
21 The Select Committee on the Bankruptcy Bill (1994)38 rejected 
proposals for automatic discharges although one of its members was a 
firm supporter of such discharges.39 The Committee felt that “it would 
not be appropriate to introduce the concept of automatic discharges”40 
and gave the following reasons for their decision: 
Firstly, the Committee felt that it is difficult to arrive at a set of criteria 
that satisfies all parties (as demonstrated by the varied suggestions 
from the representors). 
Secondly, the Committee felt that automatic discharge would provide 
no incentive for bankrupts to co-operate with the Official Assignee in 
the administration of their estates and the discharge of their debts. 
Thirdly, the Committee felt that it is likely that the knowledge that 
discharge from bankruptcy would be automatic after a period of time 
could have the effect of encouraging debtors not to take their financial 
obligations seriously. 
(a) Difficulty in determining discharge criteria 
22 The Select Committee had received a number of representations 
on automatic discharges, mostly from undischarged bankrupts, but 
remained unconvinced. The representors suggested that automatic 
discharges be granted on the basis of various criteria. These included the 
cause of bankruptcy, the amount and nature of bankruptcy debts, the 
conduct of the bankrupt before and after his bankruptcy, the duration 
of the bankruptcy and other mitigating factors. 
                                                                       
36 Insolvency Law Review Committee (UK), Insolvency Law and Practice (1982) 
(Cmnd 8558) at [15] para 33. 
37 Thomas H Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Harvard University 
Press, 1986) ch 10. 
38 Eighth Parliament of Singapore, Report of the Select Committee on the Bankruptcy 
Bill (Bill No 16/94) which was presented to Parliament on 7 March 1995. 
39 See supra n 33. 
40 Eighth Parliament of Singapore, Report of the Select Committee on the Bankruptcy 
Bill (Bill No 16/94) at p vi. For a ministerial statement in Parliament on the Select 
Committee’s conclusions, see Singapore Parliamentary Debates (1995) vol 64 at 
col 1082–1083. 
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(b) Lack of incentives to co-operate with the Official Assignee 
23 The Select Committee echoed the fears of bankruptcy officers 
involved in the administration of bankruptcy estates in this regard. 
These officers believed that automatic discharges would provide 
insufficient incentives for a bankrupt to repay his debts or to co-operate 
with the Official Assignee in recovering assets and in the administration 
of his affairs. Logically, if debtors could wipe out their debts by a mere 
passage of time, without being required to make payments or surrender 
their assets or without suffering any consequences of their bankruptcy, 
there would be no need for any co-operation with the trustee. Noting 
that the UK law does not consider the prior conduct of the bankrupt 
which resulted in his bankruptcy before his automatic discharge, Ian 
Fletcher rightly points out that “there is a danger of progressive erosion 
of the standards of commercial morality, to the extent that bankruptcy 
could in time be viewed as a mere rite of passage, or formative 
experience, carrying little or no connotation of moral opprobrium”.41 
24 As the onus would be on the Official Assignee to continuously 
monitor a bankrupt’s affairs and object to a bankrupt’s automatic 
discharge, it would increase the burden and costs of administration. 
Speaking in Parliament at the Second Reading of the Bankruptcy Bill in 
1994, the Minister of Law asked rhetorically:42 
Should the onus be on the individual who has become indebted to 
demonstrate that he has taken sufficient steps to arrange his financial 
affairs in such a way that will enable him to discharge his debts? Or 
should the burden be, as it appears in the United Kingdom, on the 
Official Assignee who has to make an appearance in court or object to 
a discharge? 
25 In yearly discussions amongst insolvency regulators in countries 
belonging to the International Association of Insolvency Regulators,43 
this was disclosed as one of the serious disadvantages of automatic 
discharges in both the UK and Australia. The required vigilance of this 
nature on the part of the part of the regulator or trustee to object 
requires considerable resources of its own. It is not surprising that for 
the year 2001 there were only 24 objections by trustees to automatic 
discharges in Australia.44 
                                                                       
41 Ian F Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency (3rd Ed, London, 2002) at [323]. 
42 Singapore Parliamentary Debates (1994) vol 63 at col 412. 
43 Formed in 1993, this association of government regulators from 32 countries 
regularly meet to exchange information, report on recent developments in their 
region, discuss current thinking on insolvency policy and legislation and share 
experiences on administration and practice. For further details visit 
www.insolvencyreg.org. 
44 According to the Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia Annual Report for 2001–
2002, table 22. The number of actual automatic discharges was not reported. 
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(c) Forsaking financial obligations 
26 There is sufficient evidence to support the Select Committee’s 
view that debtors may be encouraged to refuse to pay their debts under 
a regime of automatic discharges from bankruptcy. As the Hong Kong 
Law Reform Commission, which recommended such a remedy in 1995 
appeared to recognise, the introduction of automatic discharges would 
“shift the emphasis from discharge being a privilege to its being a 
right”.45 The Commission’s belief, however, that a procedure to allow the 
trustee or creditor to object to an automatic discharge would provide a 
safeguard against abuse or misconduct by the bankrupt, proved wrong. 
Following the introduction of automatic discharges from bankruptcy in 
1996, Hong Kong witnessed a phenomenal increase in bankruptcy in the 
next few years. Between 1996 and 2004, self-petitions for bankruptcy 
rose from 0.7% in 1994 to 86% by 2004,46 despite a deep-rooted cultural 
stigma of bankruptcy. 
27 It was a similar story in Australia when the period of automatic 
discharge was reduced from three years to six months in 1996. As a 
result, debtors were rushed to file bankruptcy petitions thus prompting 
the Government to pass new legislation in 2003 to restore the three-year 
period.47 In the UK, the reduction of the period of bankruptcy for 
purposes of an automatic discharge, from three years to 12 months, by 
the Enterprise Act 2002, is believed to have caused a substantial increase 
in bankruptcies almost immediately. In the nine months following the 
coming into force of the Enterprise Act on 1 April 2004, bankruptcies 
rose by 29.6% from 21,109 to 27,374. According to Steven Frieze, this 
was the result of bankruptcy now being considered a “soft option”.48 
28 It was therefore concluded that automatic discharges were 
unacceptable in our system of bankruptcy administration and would 
not meet the interests of both creditors and the public. After the Bill was 
brought into force, there were no calls from the public or the legal 
community for the introduction of automatic discharges. In 1999, when 
                                                                       
45 Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Report on Bankruptcy (1995) paras 17.24, 
17.26. 
46 Official Receiver’s Office (Hong Kong), Statistics on Compulsory Winding up and 
Bankruptcy, http://www.info.gov.hk/oro/ststistics/statistics.htm. See also Daniel 
Buenas, “Self-declared bankrupts swell with relaxed rules” Business Times 
(Singapore) (4 October 2003). 
47 Stephen Davies, Insolvency and the Enterprise Act 2002 (Jordon Publishing, London, 
2003). 
48 Steven A Frieze, “Personal Insolvency – One Year After the Enterprise Act came 
into Force” (2005) Insolvency Intelligence vol 18, no 4 at 57 and 58. According to 
statistics released in the House of Commons, bankruptcy orders made in 2004–
2005 totalled 38,130, rising to 52,327 in 2005–2006 and 64,488 in 2006–2007: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cm/hansard/com070711/text
/70711woo16.htm.  
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the Bankruptcy Act was amended by the reduction of the period of 
bankruptcy to three years, for purposes of obtaining discharge by 
certificate of the Official assignee, the Minister of State stressed that 
there “will be no automatic discharges”.49 If automatic discharges were 
an unacceptable remedy, how could we devise a discharge mechanism 
that would still provide for easier discharges and balance the interests 
between debtors and creditors? 
B. Inspiration from an Australian proposal 
(1) The Harmer proposal 
29 Rather ironically, it was a proposal in the Harmer Report, in 
respect of automatic discharges (which we had rejected), that provided 
the ideas for the novel method of discharge by certificate of the Official 
Assignee which we finally adopted. 
30 The Harmer Report had initially proved useful in its recognition 
of two main characteristics of bankruptcy.50 These were the 
rehabilitation of bankrupts and the function of discharge in regulating 
commercial morality or behaviour. The balance of these interests in a 
commercial centre like Singapore was a highly desirable goal. The 
challenge was to adequately safeguard both interests. 
31 The Harmer Report suggested as an “appropriate policy”51 that 
automatic discharges be expedited by an early discharge on a trustee’s 
certificate.52 The Commission’s proposals, briefly, were as follows:53 
(a) Where the trustee administering a bankrupt estate is of 
the opinion that a bankrupt is eligible for discharge before 
automatic discharge would normally occur, the trustee could 
issue and file with the court a certificate to that effect. 
                                                                       
49 Singapore Parliamentary Debates (1999) vol 70 at col 2186. 
50 The Law Reform Commission Report No 45, General Insolvency Inquiry 
(Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1988) (the Harmer Report) 
at [541]. 
51 Id, at [228]. The other two suggested approaches were retaining the existing 
structure of discharges and retaining the existing structure with certain 
modifications to provide for easier automatic discharges such as reducing the 
qualifying period of bankruptcy from three years to one year and revising the 
grounds for objections to such discharges. 
52 Harmer Report, at [229]–[230]. This recommendation was not accepted by the 
Australian Government.  
53 Id, at [229]. The draft legislation proposed by the Harmer Commission appears at 
Appendix A, Pt J, [115]–[119] of its report. 
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(b) In deciding whether a certificate should be issued, the 
trustee would be required to have regard to a number of 
prescribed considerations. 
(c) A certificate would operate to discharge the bankrupt at 
the expiration of a specific period (for example, two months 
after the date the certificate is filed) unless, within that period, 
an objection is filed by a creditor. 
(d) The trustee would be required to notify each creditor of 
the filing of the certificate and provide a statement explaining 
the effect of filing the certificate and a copy of the report on his 
administration. 
(e) A creditor would be entitled to object to discharge by 
operation of the certificate. 
(f) If such objection were filed by a creditor, discharge of 
the debtor would be postponed until the matter had been 
determined by the court. 
32 The Harmer proposal was for an expedited automatic discharge, 
at the instance of the trustee, though largely court supervised. This 
proposal did not give the trustee powers to grant a straight discharge by 
certificate. Instead, the trustee’s certificate merely indicated to the court 
that the bankrupt was fit for discharge earlier than the three-year period 
for automatic discharges. It was the court which had wide powers to 
uphold objections to the certificate being issued by the trustee entered 
by a creditor or the Inspector General for Bankruptcy. In deciding 
whether to uphold the trustee’s certificate, the court was required to take 
into account prescribed factors listed in the draft legislation.54 
(2) The difficulties with the Harmer proposal 
33 Whilst there were a number of advantages in this proposal, the 
Commission itself noted “several difficulties”. In particular, the 
Commission was concerned that for the successful implementation of 
its proposal for a discharge by the trustee’s certificate, trustees would 
have to be given “adequate, objective guidelines”.55 There was the danger 
of inconsistent decisions between various trustees. Further, a trustee 
may be subjected to pressures to either give or refuse a certificate. 
Indeed, the Commission’s proposals, because they were largely court 
driven, had the disadvantages of delay, increase in costs for trustees, 
bankrupts and objecting creditors. 
                                                                       
54 A number of these were adopted in our scheme of discharge by certificate of the 
Official Assignee under s 125 of the Act but not listed in the Act. These were 
approved by the High Court in Re Ng Lai Wat [1996] 2 SLR 106 at [118]. 
55 Id, at [230]. The Harmer proposal was not accepted by the Australian Government. 
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34 The writer’s first thoughts, as Official Assignee, on reading the 
Harmer Report was whether we could have a straight discharge by 
certificate of the Official Assignee. What became obvious was that the 
difficulties identified by the Harmer Commission had to be addressed if 
this method of discharge by certificate of the trustee was to be 
recommended for adoption in Singapore. 
V. Discharge by certificate of the Official Assignee 
A. The solution 
35 What was needed was clear. We needed a more liberal regime in 
respect of bankruptcy discharges, especially in cases where bankruptcy 
had arisen from misfortune rather than malpractice. It would need to be 
an inexpensive method of discharge, provide incentive to bankrupts to 
work towards their discharge, promote business entrepreneurship and 
be more acceptable to creditors in keeping with Singapore’s position as a 
financial hub. How was such a system to be devised? 
36 Instead of automatic discharges, a scheme of easier discharges 
by certificate of the Official Assignee was decided upon. As explained 
later in the Official Assignee’s Guide to the Bankruptcy Act (1995):56 
With the scheme of easier discharges, bankrupts would be encouraged 
to work towards an early discharge. This would have the salutary effect 
of promoting the policy of encouraging business entrepreneurship 
without eroding financial discipline and commercial morality. 
B. Our concerns with the proposed solution 
37 In addition to the difficulties highlighted by the Harmer 
Commission, there were some additional concerns in the office of the 
Official Assignee with the proposal to provide for discharges by 
certificate. The first was a public law question. Could a bankruptcy 
order, being an order of the High Court, be effectively set aside by the 
administrative act of the regulator-trustee in bankruptcy? If so, what 
ought to be the criteria for discharges by certificate and how should 
these be determined? Should the criteria be spelt out in the law? If so, 
would we face constant and costly challenges in court over the Official 
Assignee’s decisions? Administratively, how was the Official Assignee 
going to maintain fairness and consistency in determining who ought to 
be discharged? 
                                                                       
56 Supra, n 8 at [28]. 
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C. The legislative provisions 
(1) Discharge at the Official Assignee’s discretion: s 125 
38 The new s 125 of the Bankruptcy Act,57 which came into effect 
on 15 July 1995, provided as follows: 
125.—(1) The Official Assignee may, in his discretion and 
subject to section 126, issue a certificate discharging him from 
bankruptcy. 
(2) The Official Assignee shall not issue a certificate discharging 
a bankrupt from bankruptcy under sub-section (1) unless– 
(a) a period of 5 years has lapsed since the date of the 
commencement of the bankruptcy and 
(b) the debts which have been proved in bankruptcy do 
not exceed $100,000 or such other sum as may be prescribed. 
[emphasis added] 
39 Subsection (3) further provided for the notice of discharge to be 
given to the Registrar of the High Court and to be published in the 
Government Gazette and in any local newspaper. This was to ensure that 
the Registrar’s records captured the fact of discharge and that the public 
was similarly informed of the discharge. No formal application was 
needed and the procedure for the issuance of the Official Assignee’s 
certificate was kept simple.58 
40 In order to be eligible for consideration for discharge by the 
Official Assignee’s certificate, a bankrupt had to satisfy only two 
requirements relating to the amount of his debts ($100,000)59 and the 
length of his bankruptcy (five years).60 The Official Assignee was thus 
precluded from issuing the certificate unless a period of five years had 
lapsed since the commencement of the bankruptcy and the proven 
bankruptcy debts did not exceed $100,000. The five-year period was 
chosen to give the Official Assignee sufficient time to review the large 
amount of cases that had been accumulated over the years and to allow 
the older cases to be processed first. Additionally, it would give the 
Official Assignee sufficient time to investigate, realise and distribute the 
assets to creditors in new bankruptcies. Bankrupts too would have time 
                                                                       
57 Cap 20, 2000 Rev Ed. 
58 For details of the procedure on discharge by Official Assignee’s certificate see Kala 
Anandarajah, et al, Law and Practice of Bankruptcy in Singapore and Malaysia, 
(Butterworths Asia, 1999) at [427]–[428]. 
59 This amount was increased to $250,000 in September 1997 and to a further 
$500,000 in May 1999. See infra n 96. 
60 This period was reduced to three years in September 1999 by the Bankruptcy 
(Amendment) Act (Act 37 of 1999). 
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to contribute sufficiently towards their bankruptcy estates for the 
benefit of their creditors to qualify for discharge. 
41 At the same time, discharge by order of the court was made less 
onerous under s 124 of the 1995 Act61 to support the regime for easier 
discharges and to assure deserving bankrupts that they would be 
assisted in obtaining a court discharge if they did not qualify for 
discharge by the Official Assignee’s certificate. First, the application to 
court for a discharge could now be made “at any time after the making 
of a bankruptcy order”.62 The need to conduct a public examination of 
the bankrupt was removed. The requirement that the bankrupt’s assets 
had to be less that 50% of his debts to be eligible for an absolute 
discharge was amended to a mere 25% and that too only if the bankrupt 
had committed a fraudulent disposition of property.63 More 
importantly, the category of persons who could apply for a court 
discharge was expanded from only the bankrupt himself to any person 
having an interest in the matter64 and including the Official Assignee. 
Indeed, the Official Assignee has given the assurance that he will assist in 
making the application to court in “all deserving cases”.65 
42 In 1996, in the case of Re Siah Ooi Choe, ex parte Hongkong and 
Shanghai Bank Banking Corporation,66 the High Court had occasion to 
consider the “scheme of the discharge provisions” in the new Act. In that 
case, the bankrupt was a very successful entrepreneur prior to his 
bankruptcy. He had incurred substantial debts exceeding $140 million 
when his business empire collapsed, following an economic recession. 
Nine of the 30 institutional creditors objected to his application to court 
                                                                       
61 Cap 20, 2000 Rev Ed. 
62 Section 124(1) of the Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20, 2000 Rev Ed). Commenting on this 
provision in Re Siah Ooi Chee [1998] 1 SLR 903, Khoo J opined: “It seems to me 
that except in very exceptional circumstances, the minimum waiting time for s 124 
cases should be at least similar to that for s 125 cases; it should probably be longer, 
but not necessarily in a proportion measured by the amount of the indebtedness, as 
otherwise there would be many cases where no application could ever be made 
because of the size of the debt, and this would be quite contrary to the intention of 
the Act.” The Court of Appeal took a similar view in Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v 
Indra Krishnan [2005] 1 SLR 395. 
63 See s 124(4) of the Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20, 2000 Rev Ed), considered by the High 
Court in Re Siah Ooi Choe, ex parte Hongkong and Shanghai Bank Banking 
Corporation [1998] 1 SLR 903. 
64 The intent was for a concerned family member or friend, having the means to assist 
the bankrupt, to obtain a discharge in deserving cases. There may be little purpose 
in such an application without the approval of the Official Assignee. 
65 See the Official Assignee’s Guide to the Bankruptcy Act 1995 (2nd Ed) at [33], 
Insolvency and Public Trustee’s Office, Bankruptcy Information Sheet No 4, “How 
to be Discharged from Bankruptcy” at [4]. Under s 280(1) of the UK Insolvency 
Act 1986, only the bankrupt can be the applicant. 
66 [1998] 1 SLR 903 considered in the Malaysian cases of Re Joshua Tan Pin Pin 
[2007] 4 MLJ 534; Re Siow Ah Moi @ Seow Yin Fong [2007] 3 MLJ 713. 
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for a discharge. The Official Assignee supported the application as the 
bankrupt had made substantial effort to make payments to his 
bankruptcy estate although these represented a small fraction of his 
enormous debts. The High Court upheld the Registrar’s order of 
discharge. Warren Khoo J took the opportunity to explain the rationale 
of the new discharge provisions:67 
A proper approach to an application to discharge from bankruptcy 
involves a consideration of the object and purpose of these new 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20, 1996 Ed) (the Act). The Act 
was designed to meet two major conflicting concerns. One stemmed 
from the recognition that many an individual businessman becomes 
insolvent not through any fault, moral or otherwise, but through just 
being caught at the wrong turning of the economic cycle. It would be 
in the interest of society that people who had become bankrupt in 
such circumstances, and generally, should be given a second chance in 
life, so that the social cost of waste of entrepreneurial resources could 
be reduced. The other concern was that, without proper safeguards, 
people who had used dishonest or fraudulent methods in conducting 
their business affairs to the detriment of their creditors might get an 
undeserved advantage from their own wrongdoings. The fear of 
people taking advantage of their own frauds is probably as old as the 
institution of bankruptcy itself, and it was natural that such fears were 
highlighted when an easier regime for discharge from bankruptcy was 
being proposed. 
(a) The $100,000 limit 
43 Before the Select Committee, the amount of $100,000 was the 
subject of a number of representations. These came from both 
undischarged bankrupts and financial institutions which by the mid-
1990s made up more than 60% of the petitioning creditors. Bankrupts 
suggested that the ceiling be raised to as high as $1m whilst creditors 
wanted it to be lowered to $50,000.68 This was hardly surprising given 
their different and often competing interests. The $100,000 was retained 
as the Select Committee considered this was a reasonable ceiling to set at 
that time. Easier discharges by certificate were being introduced for the 
first time and 71% of the bankrupts had debts below $100,000 and were 
eligible for the Official Assignee’s consideration.69 
                                                                       
67 Id, at [907]–[908]. 
68 Singapore Parliamentary Debates (1995) vol 64 at col 1082–1083.  
69 As revealed by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Law in Parliament 
on 23 March 1995 at the Third Reading of the Bankruptcy Bill: Singapore 
Parliamentary Debates (1995) vol 64 at col 1083.  
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(b) The Official Assignee’s discretion 
44 The Official Assignee’s exercise of his discretion under s 125 of 
the Act is of course subject to judicial review under s 126. However, the 
decision to give the Official Assignee an unfettered discretion in issuing 
a discharge certificate, under s 125, was a deliberate one. The absence of 
legal conditions on the exercise of his discretion (other than in respect 
of the period of bankruptcy and the debt amount) was to discourage 
unnecessary judicial challenges, expedite the discharge process and 
contain costs. For this reason, the factors that the Official Assignee could 
take into account in the exercise of his discretion were not prescribed in 
the Act. To have done so would have encouraged judicial challenges 
based on the purported existence or absence of one factor or the other 
and involved the Official Assignee in prolonged and costly litigation. 
This would have unnecessarily fettered the exercise of the Official 
Assignee’s discretion. 
45 In contrast, on an application, under s 124 of the Act, for an 
order of discharge by the court, the High Court may refuse to discharge 
the bankrupt or may discharge him but subject him to “such conditions 
as it thinks fit to impose”.70 These include conditions with respect to any 
income which may be subsequently due to him or acquired by him after 
his discharge. In addition, where the bankrupt has committed any 
bankruptcy offence or any offence concerning fraudulent deeds and 
dispositions under the Penal Code71 or is guilty of misconduct as 
prescribed in s 124(5,) he can only be granted a conditional discharge. 
46 These conditions were described by Justice Warren Khoo in Re 
Siah Ooi Choe72 as a “rather exhaustive list”.73 For that reason, the judge 
explained, the factors that the court is required to consider when dealing 
with such an application “are all set out in the Act” and in exercising its 
discretion the court “should be guided largely by these provisions”. 
Despite their “discretion” Khoo J further cautioned judges that what 
they “must not do is to introduce or take into consideration 
requirements or factors which go against the dominant object or 
purpose of the Act”.74 Indeed, it is submitted, that it is difficult in these 
circumstances to argue that the court has a discretion that is either wide 
or unfettered. 
                                                                       
70 Section 124(3) of the Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20, 2000 Rev Ed).  
71 (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) ss 421–421. For a fuller discussion see Re Siah Ooi Choe 
[1998] 1 SLR 903. 
72 [1998] 1 SLR 903. 
73 At para 16 of his judgment in Re Siah Ooi Chee [1998] 1 SLR 903. 
74 Ibid. 
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47 The factors that the Official Assignee would consider were, 
therefore, not spelt out in legislation but left entirely to the Official 
Assignee to determine administratively. For public information, these 
were announced in Parliament at the time the Bankruptcy Bill was 
tabled.75 The Official Assignee subsequently, in information sheets and 
in a published Guide to the Bankruptcy Act 1995, made it clear to both 
bankrupts and creditors what these factors were. They would “include” 
the following:76 
(1) the cause of the bankruptcy; 
(2) the period of the bankruptcy; 
(3) the bankrupt’s assets and payments to his bankruptcy 
account; 
(4) the bankrupt’s conduct; and 
(5) the level of the bankrupt’s co-operation given to the Official 
Assignee in the administration of his affairs. 
48 Again the choice of the word “include” in introducing the list of 
factors was carefully chosen. This was in order to give the Official 
Assignee complete discretion in the choice of factors relevant to a 
particular case and not to be shackled by an exhaustive list of factors. 
What is clear from the list itself is that speedier discharges were to be 
available to persons who had become bankrupt because of misfortune 
rather than malpractice. The clear message to bankrupts was that the 
speed of their discharge from bankruptcy was in their own hands. That 
their effort was to be rewarded by earlier discharges was also emphasised 
by factors (3) to (5) as stated above. 
49 The nature of the Official Assignee’s discretion to grant a 
discharge came up for scrutiny before the High Court in Re Ng Lai Wat; 
Official Assignee v Housing and Development Board.77 In that case, the 
bankrupt (Ng) had been issued with a discharge certificate by the 
Official Assignee after six years in bankruptcy. He had an outstanding 
debt in respect of rental of business premises with the Housing and 
Development Board (HDB). Ng had been earning a low income and had 
fully co-operated with the Official Assignee. The only property that Ng 
had was a small HDB flat which did not vest in the Official Assignee as 
                                                                       
75 Singapore Parliamentary Debates (1994) vol 63 at col 402. These appear to have 
been approved by the court in Re Ng Lai Wat 1996] 3 SLR 106 at 110. 
76 At p 28. See also Bankruptcy Information Sheet No 4 entitled “How to be 
discharged from bankruptcy” available at the IPTO website: www.ipto.gov.sg. 
77 [1996] 3 SLR 106. For a criticism of the case, see Lee Eng Beng, “Discharge under 
the new bankruptcy regime: Re Ng Lai Wat” (1996) SJLS 600; Tan Sook Yee, 
“Bankruptcy and the owner of an HDB flat” (1997) 9 SAcLJ 199. 
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expressly stated under s 51 of the HDB Act.78 The HDB objected to the 
discharge and took out an application in court, under s 126(4) of the 
Bankruptcy Act, for an order prohibiting the Official Assignee from 
issuing the certificate or in the alternative that the discharge be subject 
to the condition that the HDB be entitled to the net proceeds of sale of 
Ng’s share in Ng’s flat in the event of sale. The Deputy Registrar made 
the conditional order of discharge as requested by the HDB. The Official 
Assignee appealed against the order. 
50 The Official Assignee submitted79 that the court should be 
cognisant of the essential differences between the powers of the court 
and the Official Assignee as provided under the Act. It was clear from 
the provisions in the Act that the Official Assignee, as administrator of 
the affairs of bankrupts, had been given by Parliament “an absolute and 
unfettered discretion”80 to issue a certificate of discharge. The court, 
therefore, ought not to intervene in the exercise of that discretion except 
for very good reasons. The Official Assignee further submitted that the 
condition imposed for Ng’s discharge was “contrary to Parliament’s 
intention in enacting the Act – to rehabilitate bankrupts and to address 
certain weaknesses in the previous legislation. It would render the OA’s 
certificate of discharge inoperative under the new provisions if 
conditions similar to the present were imposed.”81 Whilst it was accepted 
that the court had powers to impose conditions to the discharge, the 
thrust of the argument was that the very scheme of easier discretionary 
discharges as envisioned by the Act depended on the Official Assignee’s 
exercise of his discretion not being circumscribed unnecessarily. 
51 The learned judge held that the word “may” in s 125 (ignoring 
the words “in his discretion”) and s 126 was used in “a permissive sense” 
and hence the discretion of both the court and the Official Assignee “is 
completely unfettered”.82 She further reasoned that “[a]dmittedly 
section 126 of the Act does not contain qualifying words to the effect 
that the court can interfere with the OA’s decision only if the decision is 
unreasonable”. The question as to the nature and frequency of 
permissible court intervention in the exercise of the Official Assignee’s 
discretion, given the legislative provisions and the fact that the Official 
Assignee is a quasi-judicial officer, remained unanswered. It has been 
                                                                       
78 Cap 129, 1996 Rev Ed. This is a public housing scheme that houses about 85% of 
the population whose roof over their heads is protected by the HDB Act. 
79 These submissions are reproduced in full in the judgment reported at [1996] 
2 SLR 106 at [110]–[113]. The author who was then the Official Assignee argued 
the appeal with Assistant Official Assignee Andy Sim. 
80 Re Ng Lai Wat, Official Assignee v Housing and Development Board [1996] 
3 SLR 106 at [110]. 
81 At p 112 of the case report. 
82 Re Ng Lai Wat, Official Assignee v Housing and Development Board [1996] 
3 SLR 106 at [118]. 
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held that in reviewing the acts of the Official Assignee in relation to the 
administration of a bankrupt’s estate that the court will not intervene 
unless there was bad faith or absurdity.83 
(2) Permitting creditor objections: s 126 
52 Both creditors and bankrupts have the right of judicial review if 
dissatisfied with the acts or omissions of the Official Assignee.84 In 
addition, creditors’ interests are safeguarded by the provision of a 
mechanism for creditors to object to a bankrupt’s discharge by 
certificate of the Official Assignee. Section 126 of the Act requires the 
Official Assignee to serve a notice of his intention to discharge the 
bankrupt together with a statement of his reasons for wishing to do so. 
If a creditor’s objections are rejected by the Official Assignee, the 
creditor may then apply to court to prohibit the Official Assignee from 
issuing the certificate of discharge as was done in Re Ng Lai Wat. Upon 
hearing the creditor’s grounds of objection, the court may dismiss the 
application or make an order imposing conditions for the discharge or 
order that the bankrupt shall not be discharged for a further period of 
two years, effectively suspending the Official Assignee’s decision for two 
years. Rather significantly, the court was not given the power, upon 
hearing such an objection, to allow the application, that is, to prohibit 
the Official Assignee from issuing the certificate. 
VI. Implementation of the new discharge law85 
53 Described as “the first of its kind in the world”86 the innovation 
of discharge by certificate of the Official Assignee received considerable 
interest amongst local legal and insolvency practitioners and within the 
international insolvency community. It was clear before the date of 
implementation on 15 July 1995, that its success would largely depend 
on the rate of creditor objections to the Official Assignee’s attempts to 
discharge bankrupts by his certificate and in the number and frequency 
of challenges in court. There would also be considerable scrutiny of the 
cases chosen by the Official Assignee in granting a discharge. 
54 The creditors’ main concern was whether the Official Assignee 
would be fair in selecting the right people deserving of easier discharges 
                                                                       
83 For a fuller discussion on this point, see Lee Eng Beng, supra n 77, at [601]. Duty of 
a trustee in respect of the adjudication of proofs was held to be quasi-judicial by 
the Singapore High Court in Erprima SA v Chee Yoh Chuang [1998] 1 SLR 83. 
84 Under s 31 of the Bankruptcy Act (Cap 20, 2000 Rev Ed). 
85 All statistics have been obtained from the website of the Insolvency and Public 
Trustee’s Office (“IPTO”) at http://www.ipto.gov.sg and from the IPTO. 
86 Kala Anandarajah, et al, Law and Practice of Bankruptcy in Singapore and Malaysia 
(Butterworths Asia, 1999) at p 426. 
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or whether bankrupts would be able to get a discharge purely because of 
the efflux of time. On the other hand, bankrupts had to be convinced 
that the Official Assignee was serious in discharging them under the 
new scheme and that there would be fairness in the new discharge 
system. To achieve consistency in the selection process, private trustees 
were not permitted under the Act to exercise the powers of the Official 
Assignee in granting a discharge by certificate but could apply to the 
Official Assignee instead.87 To ensure creditors’ support, the grounds 
upon which bankrupts were to be granted a discharge by certificate and 
the amount of dividend payments that would be paid to them were 
disclosed in notices to creditors. A 24-hour answering service 
(Bankruptcy Information Service) to transmit a 40-second message on 
the criteria for discharges and a hot-line for public inquiries were 
installed. 
55 The success of the novel experiment to expeditiously discharge 
bankrupts by certificate of the Official Assignee went beyond all 
expectations. 
A. Low creditor objections 
56 It was encouraging to note that of the first 17,535 creditors who 
were notified, by February 1998, of the Official Assignee’s intention to 
discharge bankrupts, only 817 (4.6%) objected to the discharge. None of 
the 21 creditors who proceeded to court to prohibit the Official Assignee 
from discharging the bankrupts succeeded. Of the total number of 
26,340 notices sent to creditors, between 15 July and 30 June 1999, there 
were objections in only 1,522 or 5.5% of the cases. 
57 When the amount of the debts of $100,000 for eligibility for 
discharge by certificate was raised in subsequent years until at least 2002, 
the creditor objection rate remained fairly low and showed no 
significant rise. For example, in July 1995, when the scheme was first 
implemented the objection rate was 5.1%, in September 1997 (when the 
amount of the debts were increased to $250,000) the rate was 5.7% and 
this rose to only 5.8% in May 1999 when the minimum debt level was 
raised to $500,000. 
                                                                       
87 Section 36(3) of the Act. Private trustees were permitted to administer bankruptcy 
estates for the first time under Pt IV the 1995 Act. However, there have been very 
few takers with only 21 bankruptcy estates having been administered by private 
trustees between 1995 and 2006. 
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58 Creditor objections were mostly from banks (36%), credit card 
companies (18%) and finance and hire-purchase companies (6%). Of 
the 1522 creditor objections received between 15 July 1995 and 30 June 
1999, the Official Assignee accepted only 381 or 25% of these objections 
as having any merit and rejected 1,141 or 75%. 
59 The objections that were upheld and further investigated were 
in cases where the creditor was able to provide evidence of misconduct 
including the concealment of assets. Only 31 creditors, or 0.1% of those 
who had received the Official Assignee’s notice and 1.3% of those who 
had objected to the discharge, finally challenged the Official Assignee’s 
rejection of their objections in court. None succeeded and their 
applications were dismissed with costs. Creditors were thus made aware 
that unreasonable objections would not be upheld by the Official 
Assignee or by the court. 
60 The low rate of creditor objections showed the confidence that 
the creditors had in the Official Assignee selecting the right persons for 
discharge by his certificate. This was achieved with careful planning. 
A special Bankruptcy Unit for Discharges (“BUD”) was set up with 
sufficient administrative support to implement the new scheme. We 
were aware of the importance of staff applying the criteria for selection 
fairly and consistently. A standard review form was drawn up for the use 
of staff reviewing bankruptcy files and their recommendations were 
monitored and reviewed by a review committee comprising of legal 
officers and finally approved by the Official Assignee. In this way, 
inconsistencies in the application of the selected criteria for discharges 
were reduced. 
61 All files reviewed were placed in three categories. These were 
category 1 (ready for discharge), category 2 (discharge to be postponed 
for follow-up action) and category 3 (discharge not supported), for 
example where the bankruptcy had been due to fraud or the bankrupt 
had disappeared for sometime. Bankruptcy officers subsequently 
conducted interviews with bankrupts in category 2 to advise them on 
how they could get themselves discharged from bankruptcy. 
62 BUD was sufficiently organised to send out the first 750 notices 
to creditors of the Official Assignee’s intention to discharge by certificate 
on 15 July 1995, the very day the enabling legislation came into effect. 
B. Making the right choices 
63 What was important to demonstrate to creditors, bankrupts and 
the public was that in selecting the bankrupts for discharge, the Official 
Assignee was choosing people who were truly deserving of discharges. 
The low creditor objection rate of 4.6% to the first lot of notices and 
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subsequent 5% objections was encouraging. It indicated creditors’ 
confidence and acceptance of the manner in which the Official Assignee 
was exercising his discretion. This was also supported by the fact that 
none of the 31 creditors who took their objections to court succeeded. 
In the first major reported decision on s 125 of the Act, in Re Ng Lai 
Wat,88 the High Court set aside the conditions that the Registrar had 
imposed on a discharge by the Official Assignee giving further support 
to the Official Assignee’s discharge process. Finally, of 6,110 bankrupts 
discharged between 15 July 1995 and 30 June 1999, only 15 bankrupts 
(0.25%) returned to bankruptcy with the next three years. This was 
again an indication that the right people were being chosen for 
discharge by the Official Assignee. 
C. High rate of discharges 
64 The results in terms of the number of bankrupts discharged by 
the Official Assignee’s certificate were impressive. In 1995, 1,582 
bankrupts were discharged from bankruptcy as compared to 554 in 
1994 and 323 in 1993. The discharge figure rose sharply to 2,752 in 
1997. This increased the clearance rate of bankruptcy, or the number of 
new bankruptcies as against the numbers discharged, from a mere 
38.6% in 1994 to 151% in 1995 and 162% by 1997. By February 1998 
(30 months after the implementation of the new law), some 6,220 
bankrupts had been discharged. Between 15 July 1995, when the new 
Act came into effect, and 31 January 2000, 6,780 bankrupts were 
discharged by certificate of the Official Assignee. 
65 Bankrupts who did not fall within the eligibility criteria in 
terms of the period of bankruptcy (five years) and the amount of their 
debts ($100,000) but deserving of discharges were assisted by 
applications made to court for their discharges by the Official Assignee. 
For example, between 15 July 1995 and 30 June1999, 1,121 bankrupts 
and between 1999 and 2004, 2,439 bankrupts, were discharged by the 
court on the Official Assignee’s application. Some 13% of all bankruptcy 
discharges are now the result of the Official Assignee’s application made 
to court under s 124 of the Act. 
D. Benefit for creditors 
66 The benefit to creditors was also significant. In 1990, there were 
296 creditors who benefited from dividend payments of $1.3m. In 1993, 
when old files were being reviewed in preparation for the new Act of 
1995, $7.5m dividend payments were made to 908 creditors. However, 
                                                                       
88 Re Ng Lai Wat, Official Assignee v Housing and Development Board [1996] 
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since 1996, when the new discharge provisions took full effect, there 
have been record dividend payments each year: $23.7m to 3,656 
creditors in 1996, $30.7m to 4,944 in 1997, $31.2m to 6,266 creditors in 
1998 and $39.9m to 7,052 creditors in 1999. Very clearly, from the level 
of co-operation in the realisation of assets and in regular payments to 
their bankruptcy estates, bankrupts knew that bankruptcy discharges 
would now be on the basis of effort. 
67 With the evidence that the new discharge provisions were 
effective and were adequately serving the interests of both bankrupts 
and creditors, Minister of Law Jayakumar was able to inform Parliament 
in March 1998:89 
Despite the high volume of bankrupts, the bankruptcy clearance rate, 
i.e. the number of cases discharged compared to the number of new 
cases rose to a record high of 162.3%. Creditors too have had their 
interests served by receiving record dividend payments of 
$30.7 million in 1997, which was 29% higher than what was received 
in 1996. So the Official Assignee, through laws and through the 
administration, has tried to serve both the interest of individual 
bankrupts, not forgetting the interest of the creditors, which are two 
duties that he has to bear in mind. 
E. Assistance to bankrupts 
68 In order to proactively assist unemployed bankrupts to obtain 
employment and increase their payment to their bankruptcy estates and 
thus expedite their discharges, the Official Assignee commenced an 
Employment Assistance Scheme (“EASE”) in August 1998. EASE 
required bankrupts who claimed to be unemployed and hence unable to 
make regular payments, to register with EASE for employment. EASE 
was set up with assistance from the Ministry of Manpower, National 
Trades Union Congress, NTUC Income E-Ads, Community 
Development Councils, Private Employment Agencies and 
multinational companies. Between August 1998 to December 1999, 
more than 1,008 bankrupts who had disclosed unemployment as a 
reason for non-contributions, were registered with EASE. Of these, 
41.6% found jobs, with the balance of 49.4% either finding their own 
employment or owning up that they were in fact already employed.90 
                                                                       
89 On 11 March 1998: Singapore Parliamentary Reports (1998) vol 68 at col 946–947. 
90 One of the interesting facts that emerged from this project was that consistently 
25% of bankrupts who had declared they were unemployed to avoid making 
monthly payments for the benefit of their creditors admitted they were employed 
when compelled to accept jobs through EASE. Unfortunately, EASE was 
discontinued in 2000 as the Official Assignee felt the resources could be better 
employed elsewhere. Instead, in 2002, a classification of bankrupts into “Green” 
and “Red” zones to reward those in the “Green” zone with quicker approvals of 
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F. Change in mindsets 
69 What was apparent to all bankruptcy officers was the noticeable 
change in the mindsets of both bankrupts and creditors brought about 
by the new discharge provisions. It was both immediate and profound. 
Bankrupts were clearly motivated by what was now a real possibility of 
early discharges from bankruptcy. Their contributions to their 
bankruptcy estates for the benefit of their creditors were more regular. 
There was greater identification and realisation of their assets and better 
support from their family members for the settlement of debts. New 
bankrupts who were briefed on the new discharge law, with emphasis on 
the consequence of their efforts and work toward a discharge, showed a 
new level of co-operation that was previously unseen. Creditors in turn 
were more willing to accept settlement offers and generally less resistant 
to discharges. 
VII. Recognition for the new scheme of discharges 
A. Certificate of achievement from the Commonwealth 
Association for Public Administration (“CAPAM”)91 
70 CAPAM operates a global network of public service 
practitioners, academics and organisations in 53 Commonwealth 
nations. This enables them to share knowledge and “to maintain a 
current, creative and innovative approach to public administration and 
management”. In 1998, CAPAM honoured the Insolvency and Public 
Trustee’s Office of Singapore by awarding it a Certificate of 
Achievement. This followed its rating of the mode of expedited 
discharges by certificate of the Official Assignee as “truly innovative and 
worthy of recognition”. 
B. Accolades from the International Association of Insolvency 
Regulators (“IAIR”)92 
71 The problems faced by insolvency administrators throughout 
the world are strikingly similar. Efficient discharges of bankrupts which 
also reduce bankruptcy administration costs and especially if pursued in 
the interests of both creditors and bankrupts, are a frequent subject of 
discussion and debate amongst IAIR members. The success of 
                                                                                                                               
their application to travel and buy/sell HDB flats, to encourage bankrupts to work 
towards their discharge, was implemented. 
91 More information on CAPAM is available on its website: www.capam.org. The 
award was mentioned in Parliament on 18 August 1999: Singapore Parliamentary 
Debates (1999) vol 70 at col 2185. 
92 For information on IAIR see supra n 43. 
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Singapore’s innovation in the expeditious discharge of bankrupts 
attracted considerable interest at IAIR meetings. A paper on the new 
discharge mechanism presented at an IAIR meeting in New Zealand in 
1996 was well received. It was subsequently published in the IAIR 
Bulletin in December 1997. 
C. Adoption by the Malaysian Parliament 
72 The greatest compliment for the efficacy of this novel method 
of discharges was its adoption by Malaysia in 1998. The Malaysian 
Bankruptcy Act was amended93 that year to insert two new sections, 
ss 33A and 33B, to provide for discharge by certificate by the Malaysian 
Official Assignee and a procedure for objections by creditors to such a 
discharge. These two sections are in terms identical to ss 125 and 126 of 
the Singapore Act. The only difference in the Malaysian provision is that 
there is no monetary limit set for eligibility for the Official Assignee’s 
discharge. This resulted initially in a large number of applications from 
bankrupts to the Official Assignee for discharge and challenges in court 
by creditors.94 The Malaysian Act also refrained from indicating the 
circumstances that the Official Assignee was required to take into 
account in exercising his discretion in granting a discharge certificate. 
Instead, as in Singapore, the relevant factors have been decided 
administratively.95 
VIII. Extension of the discharge provisions 
73 Following its initial success and after more than 5,000 
bankrupts had been discharged, the innovation of discharge by 
certificate of the Official Assignee was extended. In September 1997, 
bankrupts with proven debts of up to $250,000 became eligible for 
consideration for discharge. In responding to a call from a Member of 
Parliament for the financial limit of $100,000, set in 1995, to be raised, 
the Minister of State for Law told Parliament:96 
                                                                       
93 The sections were brought into effect on 1 January 1999 by the Malaysian 
Bankruptcy (Amendment) Act 1998. As the Malaysian Official Assignee became 
known as the Director-General of Insolvency, by a further amendment to the 
Malaysian Act in 2003, this form of discharge is now known as discharge by 
certificate of the Director-General of Insolvency. 
94 Information obtained from the writer’s discussions with the Malaysian Official 
Assignee and his officers in 1999. 
95 These factors appear to be similar to those used in Singapore and include the cause 
of bankruptcy, age, assets of the bankrupt and the bankrupt’s conduct. See Khoo 
Kay Ping, Law and Practice of Bankruptcy (Malayan Law Journal, 2nd Ed, 2003) at 
p 315. 
96 Singapore Parliamentary Debates (1997) vol 67 at col 1521. 
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We believe that the new provision has worked well. We started with 
the financial limit of $100,000 for the Official Assignee … In the light 
of experience gained, we are satisfied that we can raise it to $250,000. 
The Official Assignee will continue to apply the same criteria to select 
the cases for discharge, balancing the interests of both creditors and 
bankrupts. 
74 In May 1999, the financial limit of $250,000 in proven debts was 
further increased to $500,000 to enable more bankrupts to fall under the 
scheme of early discharge by the Official Assignee.97 
75 Following the recommendations of the Technopreneurship 21 
Committee,98 further changes to the bankruptcy regime were introduced 
in September 1999. This was done ostensibly to help cultivate a 
calculated risk-taking culture and foster a climate of greater tolerance 
for failure.99 Further amendments to the Act100 allowed the Official 
Assignee to consider the release from bankruptcy by discharge certificate 
after three years of bankruptcy instead of the five-year period set in 
1995. This was to provide a greater incentive for bankrupts to work 
toward their discharge as demonstrated by the continuing increase in 
the dividends declared to creditors. It was also decided101 to extend the 
mechanism of termination of bankruptcy, by certificate, to cases where 
the bankrupt’s debts had been paid in full or to the satisfaction of his 
creditors by way of a composition of the debts or a scheme of 
arrangement. This enabled the Official Assignee to annul a bankruptcy 
order expeditiously by his certificate instead of having to apply to court 
as was previously required by law. 
76 In a move to make bankrupts more economically productive, 
both s 22 of the Business Registration Act and s 148 of the Companies 
Act were amended, on 15 September 1999, to enable the Official 
Assignee to administratively allow bankrupts to take part or be 
concerned in the management of any business or to be the director of a 
company without the bankrupt having to apply for leave of the court. In 
the short three-month period from October 1999 to January 2000, there 
were 25 applications received by the Official Receiver compared with a 
                                                                       
97 This was done by way of subsidiary legislation as provided under s 125 (2)(b) of the 
Act: Bankruptcy (Variation of Sum of Debts under section 125(2)(b)) Rules 1999 
(GN No S 126/1999). 
98 The Technopreneurship 21 Committee was a ministerial committee led by 
Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister Tony Tan. 
99 For a more detailed discussion, see Pauline L H Gan, “Recent Amendments to 
Singapore’s Bankruptcy Laws: Towards A More Conducive ‘Social Ambience’ For 
Technopreneurs” (2000) 29 Asia Business Law Review 63; Aaron Kok, “Automatic 
Discharge: The Panacea to our Bankruptcy Woes” (2004) Sing Law Rev 204. 
100 Bankruptcy (Amendment) Act 1999 (Act 37 of 1999). 
101 See ss 95A and 123A inserted by the Bankruptcy (Amendment) Act 1999 (Act 37 of 
1999) which came into effect on 15 September 1999. 
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mere four court applications made by bankrupts in the five years before 
the implementation of the new scheme. 
77 The redefinition of insolvency in terms of risk was not quite 
appropriate given that 90% of bankruptcies were consumer 
bankruptcies.102 A 2004 study revealed that of this group of bankrupts, 
67.3% had become insolvent due to excessive use of credit facilities.103 It 
is important to remember, however, that the1999 reforms were not 
designed to prejudice the interests of creditors. That was made clear by 
the Minister of State for Law when he moved the amendments to the 
Bankruptcy Act in 1999:104 
In formulating these changes, we have sought to strike a proper 
balance between the interests of debtors and creditors. We were 
mindful that over-liberalisation of the bankruptcy regime may erode 
creditors’ rights and make it more costly for business to obtain 
financing. Changes that would work against creditors interests have 
been avoided. 
78 Responding to Members of Parliament the Minister  
re-iterated:105 
… I think he (MP Inderjit Singh) captures the spirit behind the Bill, 
which is to encourage entrepreneurship. On the other hand, like I have 
said, we have to keep in mind the central point that we want to 
maintain a balance between the interest of the creditors and debtors. 
So we cannot go overboard. We must keep this in mind, because 
otherwise if bankrupts are able to get out of bankruptcy too easily 
without showing effort on their part, that may also increase business 
costs. 
79 The importance of maintaining this balance of interest in 
Singapore’s bankruptcy administration has received the approval of the 
High Court on a number of occasions.106 In 2002, the Chief Justice had 
occasion to consider whether the fact that a bankrupt had committed an 
offence under the Bankruptcy Act, by travelling out of Singapore on 50 
occasions without the Official Assignee’s permission, should be treated 
more leniently. In convicting him, the magistrate had opted for a non-
custodial sentence as he had considered that the accused’s offence was 
but a negligent omission “contributed by the hectic pace of an 
                                                                       
102 Singapore Parliamentary Debates (2006) vol 81 at col 619; Aaron Kok, supra n 99,  
at 206. 
103 “Bankruptcy Act: A fresh start for entrepreneurs or improvident spenders?” FYP 
project No 3451, Academic Year 2004/05, Bachelor of accountancy, National 
Technological University [40]. 
104 Singapore Parliamentary Debates (1999) vol 70 at col 2187. 
105 Singapore Parliamentary Debates (1999) vol 70 at col 2202. 
106 See, for example, Re Ng Lai Wat [1996] 3 SLR 106 and Re Siah Ooi Choe [1998] 
1 SLR 903. 
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entrepreneurial effort”. Chief Justice Yong Pung How rejected such an 
approach:107 
The promotion of enterprise in Singapore is important. However, it 
was clear from the debates on the reform to the bankruptcy regime on 
25 August 1994, culminating with the passing of the new Bankruptcy 
Act that Parliament did not intend the promotion of enterprise to be 
at the expense of the need to protect the interests of creditors and 
society. At vol 63, col 399 of the Parliamentary Reports, the Minister 
for Law, Professor S Jayakumar, stated the functions of the new Act, as 
follows: 
… to improve administration of the affairs of bankrupts and 
protect creditors’ interests without stifling entrepreneurship. 
We will strike a balance between the interest of the debtor, 
the creditor and society. 
Furthermore, at col 401 of the same report, the minister stated that the 
Act would encourage enterprise through allowing the early discharge 
of bankrupts who became bankrupts due to business failure. 
Parliament’s intention was to promote enterprise through such a 
mechanism, not through being more lenient towards bankrupts who 
broke the law while carrying on a business. 
IX. Conclusion 
80 Discharge by certificate of the Official Assignee is a major 
reform in our personal insolvency law. It is a “uniquely Singapore” legal 
innovation that has undoubtedly worked well since its inception in 
1995. By all accounts, discharge by certificate is also well regarded in 
Malaysia as an efficient bankruptcy discharge mechanism. The 
simplicity of the scheme, its informal procedures and the benefits of its 
implementation to administrators, debtors and creditors alike, have 
helped to entrench this novel institution in our legal system. Its success 
has also been largely due to the totality of legislative and administrative 
measures, described in this paper, that have helped to sustain it and the 
enthusiastic support the scheme has received from staff of the Official 
Assignee’s office. 
81 Above all, the continuous emphasis over the years by 
administrators, policy makers and the courts, that this is a remedy 
reflective of Singapore’s need to balance the interests of debtors and 
creditors, has considerably assisted in maintaining the success of this 
institution. 
82 Bankrupts will be more ready to work responsibly to secure 
their discharge and creditors more willing to accept the decisions of the 
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Official Assignee in discharging bankrupts, if both parties are satisfied 
that the administration of a bankruptcy estate is being done fairly and 
independently without their interests being compromised. That is the 
best guarantee that this innovation of discharge by certificate of the 
Official Assignee will endure. 
 
